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Abstract
Introduction
Blood transfusions are lifesaving treatments which require critical
attention to processes and details. If processes are not followed,
grievous errors can lead to sentinel events. A review of investigations
completed due to reported events will show the error trends associated with systems used throughout the blood transfusion process.

Methods
This study employed root cause analyses (RCAs) within the
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) to review the events leading to blood transfusion errors. Data was pulled from the RCA
databases within the VA National Center for Patient Safety. The
time frame was October 2014 to August 2019. A total of 53 RCAs
and aggregated reviews were included in the study. These were
reviewed for common themes and gaps present within processes.

hemolysis.2,8 Aside from breakdown of red blood cells, other risks
are associated with blood transfusions: fever, allergic reactions,
bloodborne infections, and iron overload.9,10 Injuries to the pulmonary and circulatory systems, in the forms of transfusion-related acute lung injury (TRALI) and transfusion-associated circulatory overload (TACO), can cause further complications.11,12
When reactions, complications, and fatalities occur during or
post-donation they must be reported to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).13,14 Although the number of blood transfusions decrease each year, the number of blood transfusion–related
fatalities remains consistent.15 From 2014 to 2018, there have been
244 reported fatalities nationwide: 56 in FY14, 41 in FY15, 60 in
FY16, 44 in FY17, and 43 in FY18.15

These RCAs express great variation between VHA facilities,
such as process created, number of staff reports, and number of
RCAs completed. Lack of standard practices nationwide, training
barriers, and technology barriers may explain the variation of
transfusion errors throughout the VHA. This study brings to light
questions about standardization of transfusion protocols. Future
study regarding such standardization is necessary to determine
its plausibility.

Based on the number of blood transfusions completed at the
local facility, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does an
estimated 220,400 blood transfusions each year. If processes are
not in place, the risks can have dire, if not fatal, consequences.
Each critical step must be measured and approached with accuracy when a patient undoubtedly needs blood. Blood transfusion
process studies have been conducted at non-VHA and non-U.S.
hospitals. Errors are possible, and do occur, at any step from the
moment the patient verbally consents to a blood transfusion to
the end of the procedure.16 The Institute of Medicine, in To Err
is Human, states in order to sustain continuous system improvements for patient safety, errors leading to adverse events must be
identified and learned from.17 Previous studies of various errors
note root causes result from poor communication, lack of modern
and standard operating equipment, insufficient training, lack of
standard procedures, high workloads, shortage of nursing staff,
and misunderstandings.18,19 As the largest healthcare system in
the United States, the VHA offers an amount of data unavailable
in other systems.20 The purpose of this study is to delve into the
VA’s blood transfusion processes to study the systems in use within
VA facilities. We hypothesize error trends will be identified which
are associated with adverse events, sentinel events, and close calls
related to the VA’s blood transfusion processes.

Introduction

Methods

The first idea of practical blood transfusions came about within
the 1600s; however, blood transfusions did not become routine
procedures until World War II.1 During this time, the military
transfused whole blood to those in need.2 Now, blood transfusions are used to treat numerous conditions which medications
cannot cure: blood loss due to major surgery, trauma, childbirth,
severe burns, gastrointestinal (GI) bleeds, bone marrow disorders
causing anemia, inherited anemias, and autoimmune hemolytic
anemia.3,4 Specific types of cancers, such as those in the bone marrow and GI tract, as well as chemotherapy and radiation cancer
treatments, can cause low blood cell counts.5 Blood transfusions
are used to treat these symptoms.5 Though blood transfusions
create positive outcomes for patients with diagnoses listed above,
the procedure has great risks associated with sterilization, correct
blood type, reactions, and post-transfusion ailments.

Data was requested from the VHA National Center for Patient
Safety (NCPS) database. NCPS tracks all patient safety data (inpatient and outpatient) within the VA; and the patient safety manager (PSM) tracks all safety data within their facility. Anyone with
VA computer access may input a safety report when a patient
is harmed, or could have been harmed, during their care. The
PSM reviews each safety event (sentinel, adverse, or close call)
and assigns a safety assessment code (SAC) score for actual and
potential harm.21,22 This score is determined using the SAC matrix
mapping the severity and frequency of safety events.22 A SAC score
is a scale of increasing risk, 1 being the lowest risk and 3 the
highest risk.21,22 If the safety event has a SAC score of 3, a root
cause analysis (RCA) is required.21,22,23 An RCA can be initiated
with a SAC score of 2 at the discretion of the PSM. This analysis is
conducted to identify system issues which lead to errors affecting
patient care.23 RCAs are a nonpunitive practice comprised of an
interdisciplinary team focused on systems errors.22,23 Individual
actions or human errors are not root causes. Once the series of
steps leading to the event are mapped, the root causes are determined.21 From these root causes, actions are formed to prevent
the event from reoccurring; these actions are supported from
literature reviews demonstrating their efficacy.21,23

Results
The most common events fell within the categories of incorrect or
delayed blood orders, incorrect or lack of patient identification,
and wrong blood given. The RCA for each event was reviewed and
studied. The RCAs had a crossover of multiple causes; lack of a
formal process, communication barriers, and technology barriers
were the most frequent.

Conclusion

It wasn’t until the 20th century that the medical community
knew of sterilization, anticoagulation, ABO blood types, and Rh
factors.6,7 If someone receives an incompatible blood type, their
outcome could be fatal. When an O-negative person receives
AB-positive red blood cells, the A and B antibodies in their plasma
will attack the A and B antigens on the transfused cells, causing
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This review consisted of RCAs and aggregated reviews. An aggregated review occurs when multiple patient safety event reports can
be grouped together and analyzed to determine an effective system
improvement.23 The time frame of data retrieval was October 2014
to August 2019. All inpatient and outpatient blood transfusion RCAs
were included. Keywords used to retrieve the data were “phlebotomy/-ist,” “accession,” “type and cross/screen/match,” “blood draw/
collection/ work/order/culture/bank/gas/ type,” and “blood ‘NEAR’
tube/label/specimen/sample/occult.” This search yielded 83 RCAs
and aggregated reviews combined from 140 facilities.

Table 1. Total Safety Assessment Code (SAC) Scores
SAC Actual is the level or harm the patient experienced.
SAC Potential is the level of harm the patient could
have experienced. Please note, the highest SAC score
rating is 3.21,22,23

Total Number of RCAs Reviewed
Within Each Risk Level

The scope of the project included near misses, sentinel events, and
adverse events caused due to errors directly related to steps within
the blood transfusion process. Near misses are events which do not
cause harm but have the potential to cause harm.23 Sentinel events
are events resulting in a fatality due to error.23 Adverse events are
events which cause nonfatal harm to the patient.23 Thirty of the
eighty-three events were excluded from this analysis. These exclusions were those related to routine inpatient and outpatient lab
draws, labeling of routine blood testing tubes, transport of routine
testing tubes, and venous drug overdose. RCAs were analyzed for
common themes and categorized into event types based on these
themes. Each event was then analyzed for root causes.

The final dataset includes 53 RCAs, of which 3 were aggregated
reviews. Upon reading the reported events and final descriptions,
each was sorted into RCA event types, then root causes were determined. Table 1 has the SAC score totals for each RCA. Several of
the SAC actuals were at a level 1 or 2 for risk; however, numerous
had the potential to cause severe or fatal harm to the patient.

RCA Event Types
The final dataset includes 53 RCAs, of which 3 were aggregated
reviews. The first step was to separate the RCAs into RCA event
types, or categories representing the commonalities between
RCAs, then root causes were identified. The inclusion criteria
details of each event type include:

SAC Potential

1

37

0

2

10

14

3

4

37

Totals

51

51

*Note: There were 50 RCAs and 3 aggregated reviews.
Only 1 aggregated review was scored.

The blood transfusion process was reviewed through examination
of VHA publications and documents. These were used to determine the requirements for each facility, create a process map,
and find any indication of potential variation among facilities.

Results

SAC Actual

The RCAs are a result of near misses (n=27), adverse events (n=21),
and sentinel events (n=5). Three of the sentinel events fell under the
criteria for blood orders; the other two were associated with blood
labels and the wrong blood. The 4 categories with the highest number of RCAs, as seen in Figure 1, were patient identification, blood
orders, wrong blood, and blood labels. The remaining 3 event types
had 3 or less RCAs: consent, crossmatch, and transfusion reactions.

Root Causes
The second step was to dissect the 50 RCAs and 3 aggregated
reviews further. Patterns emerged within each RCA event. This
illuminated the numerous root causes and factors leading to
errors associated with each patient safety event. A total of 12
root causes were found:
1.

Communication barrier

2.

Lack of a formal process

3.

Environmental barrier

4.

No standard operating procedure (SOP)

5.

Technology barrier

1.

Patient Identification: incorrect ID labels, wristband,
chart, etc.; lack of proper verification before transfusion

2.

Blood Orders: delayed orders, orders not followed,
orders not received

3.

Wrong Blood: received the wrong blood type regarding
platelet, plasma, and red blood cell transfusions

6.

Complex process

7.

Training/knowledge barrier

4.

Blood Label: labels placed on wrong bags, tags,
paperwork

8.

Equipment barrier

5.

Consent: lack of informed consent, consent not noted in
patient chart, as required before blood is transfused

9.

No defined roles

10. No barrier to prevent error(s)

6.

Crossmatch: no crossmatch completed before blood
given to patient

7.

Transfusion Reactions: not documented and/or
communicated appropriately

11. Low-frequency task
12. Multitasking
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Figure 1. Number of Root Causes Linked to Each RCA Event Type
Multiple root causes were found within each RCA event type: patient identification, wrong blood, blood orders, blood labels, consent,
transfusion reactions, and crossmatch. The crossover of these root causes is shown here for each RCA event type.

Root Causes

Patient Identification (n=14)

Multitasking
Low-Frequency Task
No Barrier
No Defined Roles
Equipment Barriers
Training Barrier
Complex Process
Tech Barrier
No SOP
Environment
Lack of Process
Communication Barrier

Wrong Blood (n=13)

Multitasking
Low-Frequency Task
No Barrier
No Defined Roles
Equipment Barriers
Training Barrier
Complex Process
Tech Barrier
No SOP
Environment
Lack of Process
Communication Barrier

0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Root Causes

Blood Labels (n=8)

Multitasking
Low-Frequency Task
No Barrier
No Defined Roles
Equipment Barriers
Training Barrier
Complex Process
Tech Barrier
No SOP
Environment
Lack of Process
Communication Barrier

Blood Orders (n=12)

Multitasking
Low-Frequency Task
No Barrier
No Defined Roles
Equipment Barriers
Training Barrier
Complex Process
Tech Barrier
No SOP
Environment
Lack of Process
Communication Barrier

0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Root Causes

Consent (n=3)

Multitasking
Low-Frequency Task
No Barrier
No Defined Roles
Equipment Barriers
Training Barrier
Complex Process
Tech Barrier
No SOP
Environment
Lack of Process
Communication Barrier

0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Root Causes

Crossmatch (n=1)

Multitasking
Low-Frequency Task
No Barrier
No Defined Roles
Equipment Barriers
Training Barrier
Complex Process
Tech Barrier
No SOP
Environment
Lack of Process
Communication Barrier

0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Root Causes
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0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Root Causes

0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Root Causes

Transfusion Reactions (n=2)

Multitasking
Low-Frequency Task
No Barrier
No Defined Roles
Equipment Barriers
Training Barrier
Complex Process
Tech Barrier
No SOP
Environment
Lack of Process
Communication Barrier

0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Root Causes

Figure 2. Route Causes of Blood Transfusion Errors
The Pareto chart indicates which root causes are the most common throughout the RCA events. Over 60% of root causes are due to lack
of a process, technology barrier, communication barrier, and training barrier.

Cumulative
Percent

Number of Instances
for Each Root Cause

100%

40
35

90%

34

80%

30
25
20

70%
60%

22
17

50%

17

40%

15
10

30%

9

8

8

7

20%

6

5

4

3

2

0%

Figure 1 shows how many root causes were linked to each RCA
event type. Each event type had at least 5 root causes. The only
exception is the event type crossmatch, which had 1 root cause,
lack of a formal process. A Pareto chart organized the data by
greatest occurrence of each root cause, Figure 2. Those with the
highest number of occurrences include lack of a formal process
(n=34, 24.8%), technology barrier (n=22, 16%), communication
barrier (n=17, 12.4%), and training/knowledge barrier (n=17,
12.4%). The remaining root causes occurred 9 or less times.
It is uncommon for a patient safety event to have a single root
cause and solution. Table 2 below gives a succinct description of
the reported patient safety event and SAC scores, determined root
causes, and actions to be taken. Actions are completed by assigned
staff from the unit where the safety event occurred. Outcomes of
these actions are monitored and tracked by each facilities’ PSM,
but they are not uploaded to the RCA database. The most common
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actions are updating policies, standardizing processes, improving
electronic health record (EHR) functions, education, and creation
of signs as cognitive aids.
A process map was developed using the VHA publications and RCA
data to show the gaps and process variations between facilities,
Figure 3. Several steps can be completed in any order. Availability
of training and resources varies between the 140 facilities: for
example, during the time period not all facilities had transfusion
verification software, facilities had different blood bands, access
to technology was difficult at some locations, paper and electronic
records varied, and training on blood bank software was intermittent between facilities.
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Table 2: Analysis Synopses From Blood Transfusion RCA Dataset
There is an example of each RCA event type. These descriptions represent the main findings and actions from the RCA. They do not
dictate the entire completed RCA process for each reported safety event.

Patient Identification

Event
Type

Event & Root Cause(s) Description
Safety Event: Type/screen of RBCs labeled with another patient’s
information.
• Unable to print labels from the patient’s medical record at the
point of care
• Two-person verification of a blood bank specimen not required
• Frequent interruptions during the specimen collection
• No standardized process for the safe management of printed
laboratory requisitions for multiple patients
• No standardized process in the clinical laboratory for the
receipt and distribution of blood bank specimens

Patient Identification

SAC Actual: 1 SAC Potential: 3
Safety Event: Patient’s unique R number placed backwards on
patient’s wrist band. R number not visible during identification and
verification. Not noticed until after the patient received two units
of blood.

•
•
•

Insufficient training
Limited access to policies related to blood transfusion processes
The style of band with manufacturer’s information on the
band could obscure R number if the white slip is placed in
backwards.

Actions
• Eliminate the use of preprinted labels for specimen
collection
• Implement point-of-care label printing from the EHR
• Implement a bedside second verifier process during
the collection of blood bank specimens
• Implement a process for individuals performing phlebotomy to limit distractions
• Create a warning sign that indicates procedure is in
progress and interruptions should be limited.
• Implement a standardized process for the sorting/
management of printed laboratory requisitions (SOP)
• Create a standardized process from the receipt and
distribution of blood bank specimens in the lab
• Implementation of a training program that includes
face-to-face training, simulation training, and competency assessments
• Create and post a visual reminder checklist (Patient R
number can’t be read, etc.)
• Hard copy of policies/procedures and templates for
blood product infusion will be kept current and available for staff
• Replace current band system with system to eliminate extra blood band and create a physical barrier
preventing use of an obscured R number

SAC Actual: 1 SAC Potential: 3

Blood Orders

Safety Event: Patient had a massive gastrointestinal (GI) bleed, coded, and
passed away. Patient had been on medicine service for GI bleed, then
transferred to spinal cord injury (SCI) service, where patient bled again.
• Massive blood transfusion (MBT) is a low-frequency, high-risk
event with unclear accessibility to decision making support
• No process for ordering blood or resource organization for
off-tour hours
• No standard communication process for staff and leadership
support

• Standardize a massive transfusion protocol using best
practice guidelines
• Standardize protocols for clinical, laboratory, blood
bank and logistic responses, activation triggers, and
documentation for the effective management of
massive blood loss

Wrong Blood

SAC Actual: 3 SAC Potential: 3
Safety Event: Patient received seven units of fresh frozen plasma
• Additional signs added to inside the red blood cell
(FFP) that were incompatible with their blood type. Occurred during
(RBC) refrigerators and FFP freezers stating the
an emergent MBT. Patient had GI bleed, became unresponsive,
universal donor for that blood product
coded, and passed.
• Amend MBT policy to simplify process
• All FFP will be issued using the blood bank computer
• No barrier to prevent removal of the incorrect type of FFP
system.
• No process for issuing type-specific versus universal blood
• Emergency release for blood form will be modified
products for MBT
to include patient’s blood type and a blood product
• Blood bank computer system was bypassed; no verification
compatibility chart
• Emergency release for blood form does not include the pa• Time-out upon delivery of the blood products verifytient’s blood type
ing patient, blood type, and compatibility
• MBT low-frequency task
• Education on new policies and processes
• Quarterly MBT simulation events and debrief
SAC Actual: 3 SAC Potential: 3
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Blood Label

Event
Type

Event & Root Cause(s) Description
Safety Event: Type/screen in emergency department (ED) indicated an
O-positive blood type. Four units of RBCs crossmatched and made
available for surgery. Type/screen post surgery indicated Patient had
A-negative blood. New samples confirmed A-negative blood. Samples
from ED incorrectly labeled.
•
•
•
•
•

Policy on collecting and labeling type/screen not followed
Sample not labeled with the patient info at time of collection
Two nurses did not verify sample at bedside
Type/screen and ABO/Rh compatibility performed together
Type/screen label format varies based on the printer location

Actions
• Reeducation on policies for type/screen collection
• Develop cognitive aid on pertinent steps to take
when collecting type/screen
• Standardize the type/screen label format throughout
the medical center to ensure the correct label format
is printed

Consent

SAC Actual 1 SAC Potential: 3
Safety Event: Electronic health record (EHR) blood transfusion
informed consent progress note created. Signed paper consent not
scanned into document imaging software. Blood issued by blood
bank by viewing note in EHR. Scanned paper consent not viewed.
• Vague procedures and policies
• Inconsistent verification process between nursing personnel and
blood bank personnel

• Revise process on when paper informed consent is
sent to medical records for scanning
• Revise annual competency and TMS training with
reeducation of what constitutes an actual consent
• “Blood Transfusion Directions” sheet to include a
checklist of the verification step by step process
• Revise the current EHR note to clarify that a paper
informed consent was used

Crossmatch

SAC Actual: 2 SAC Potential: 2
Safety Event: Unit of blood documented into blood bank computer system as being crossmatched, issued, and transfused. Testing
records indicate the crossmatch was never performed.
• Crossmatch labels on red blood cell units, after crossmatch has
expired, are retained
• Lack of a clear process of assigning red blood cell units to a patient following crossmatch testing

• Standardize process of expired crossmatch units by
removing red blood cell unit crossmatch tags during
daily inventory
• Standardize the process of assigning red blood cells
that have been crossmatched at the time of testing

Transfusion Reactions

SAC Actual: 1 SAC Potential: 2
Safety Event: Patient had symptomatic anemia. Notes referenced
possible transfusion reaction, but no workup ever completed.
Confusion of who would complete and when the workup would be
done. Protocol for transfusion reaction not followed.

• Develop a standardized physician’s order template for
transfusing blood
• Update blood transfusion memorandum to include
information related to infusion time

• No standardized physician order template for blood transfusion(s)
• The lack of a medical center memorandum noting blood component can be infused up to four hours
SAC Actual: 1 SAC Potential: 2
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Figure 3. Basic Blood Transfusion Process Map
The basic blood transfusion process map was created using VHA publications and information from the RCA data.24-28 This map brings
together the processes for the lab and transfusion to illustrate the complexity of the process from patient needing blood to active
transfusion. The red clouds are gaps or variations determined from the RCAs’ root causes and final safety event understanding.

CPRS = Computerized Patient Record System

Process Start/Stops

VBECS = VistA Blood Establishment Computer Software

Critical steps of process completed per each facility’s SOPs

TV Software = Transfusion Verification Software
BTRF = Blood Transfusion Record Form

Critical steps which may be completed in varying order
Part of process not available at all facilities
Decision point
Gaps/variation in process between facilities

Patient needs
(or may need)
blood products
Emergent
situation
process?

Not always
completed at
start of process
Informed
consent signed
and verified
Access to
CPRS via
computer

Patient
agrees to
receive blood
products?

YES

NO

Emergent
need vs routine
procedure

Blood band
manufactures
differ
Hospital Blood
bank/lab receives
and confirms
order(s)

Request of blood
product(s) order
entered in CPRS

Availability
of blood
products

Knowledge
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Training for
blood collection
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patient name and
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Placement/
location of
labels and tags
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Follow protocol(s)
to ensure
patient receives
appropriate care

Release of blood
units: two-person
verification of
patient name, unique
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number, ABO type
(unit and patient), Rh
type (unit and patient)

VBECS training
and competency
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Product type
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Blood band issued
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testing (two-person
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B
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of human
verification

Sign BTRF form
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Discussion
The 50 RCAs and 3 aggregated reviews were separated into 7 event
types: patient identification, blood orders, wrong blood, blood
labels, consent, crossmatch, and transfusion reactions. Twelve
root causes crossed over within the event types. The 4 root causes
with the highest occurrence were: training/knowledge, technology barriers, lack of a formal process, and communication barriers. To understand the potential reasons behind these variations,
VHA publications were examined. These documents are used
by each facility as a guide to create blood transfusion protocols,
procedures, and audit criteria.24,25,26,27,28 They give the foundation
for facilities to build upon; however, they do not give instructions
on all or how to create processes for the systems throughout the
blood transfusion process.24,26 Each facility is responsible for
ensuring processes are created, communicated, documented,
and used.24 This supports limited standardization within the VHA
blood transfusion process.
The basic process map for blood transfusions is delineated in
Figure 3. Flow, decision points, steps, and potential gaps are
determined by the VHA publications and information from the
RCA data. These are the critical steps from patient verbal consent
to end of procedure. The process contains various points where
differential variations may occur between all facilities; Figure 3
expresses these differences or gaps. A crucial component of this
process is proper identification of the patient. Within the RCAs,
there were multiple reports of a facility not requiring, or there was
no local policy requiring, two-person identification. These were
more apparent within the patient identification and blood label
event types. The most common action in response was to create
or update local policies and procedures. Two-person identification
requirements are proven to reduce transfusion errors at multiple
stages of the process.19,29 Failure to do two-person identification
of blood bank specimens and before transfusion are common,
preventable errors within the process.30
Based on the information from the VHA publications and RCAs,
the greatest inconsistency between facilities is the use of patient
identification software. This software is similar to the medication
barcode administration system. Each piece associated with the
transfusion process is scanned into the system for verification:
patient ID blood band, blood bags, caution tags, and all forms
with a barcode. While this technology decreases errors of misidentification, it is not available to all facilities.26 One nurse that
was interviewed indicated having this software at their facility would decrease any misidentification, as seen at other VAs.
The gaps within the process create potential portals for adaptations or workarounds to individual tasks or larger processes.31
Knowledge and training about these factors either increases or
reduces the chance of an adaptation being used: IT tools, non-IT
tools, tasks, processes, internal environment, organization, and
management.31
There were reported cases within the RCA data where the computer system within facility blood banks could be bypassed, outside of an emergent situation, although all blood products must be
logged in using the blood bank computer system. This occurred
more often during emergent events. At this time, there were also
complex processes in play and staff were unaware of how quickly
and correctly to issue blood. There was one instance where staff
were unaware of a function within the system. The RCA resulted
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from the incorrect use of fresh frozen plasma (FFP). A safety check
function for FFP was discovered post-safety event. This brings to
light the depth of training staff receive on and off the job.
One of the root causes for patient identification errors, shown
in Table 2, was inadequate training. The theme was apparent in
the RCAs in relation to EHR use, blood bank software, specimen
labeling, how to put in a blood order, understanding the difference between blood components, and verification procedures.
Insufficient training and education are problems that lead to
preventable errors.19 Education and retraining creates classwide
reflection about patient safety and safety goals.32 Providing proper
knowledge is vital to reduce errors. A reported event occurred due
to lack of knowledge about universal blood types. The common
universal donor is O-negative; however, this pertains only to red
blood cells.8 The universal plasma donor is of AB blood type.8 The
technician was issuing a blood order for FFP, and the patient’s
blood type was unknown. Instead of getting AB-positive blood,
the technician grabbed O-negative. When this information is not
taught, posted, or retained, it can lead to fatal consequences. One
site added a sign with the universal blood types on the blood bank
refrigerators. Another created a cognitive aid with the blood types
and compatibility between them. Training should be standard
to include the utmost vital information. The correct method for
blood transfusions should be laid out in a diagram and explain
potential side effects.33
The RCA overviews lead into communication issues. One RCA
described their policies to be “vague and verbose.” Inconsistent
information sharing, poor communication processes, and
untimely hand-off communication are recurring issues. Poor
communication most often occurred between differing clinical
specialties and/or departments, as seen in Table 2 under blood
orders. There was lack of communication between the medicine
and spinal cord injury (SCI) services and between those services
and the blood bank. Communication issues within other RCAs
occurred between nurse/physician, resident/blood bank technician, ED/inpatient unit, phlebotomist/blood bank technician, and
nurse/phlebotomist. A warm hand-off is a required standard of
care for patient safety.34 Inconsistencies and questions about care
plans are approached and solved during the hand-off. Evidence
of teamwork and collaboration between healthcare professionals
demonstrates positive health outcomes.35 Continuous effective
teamwork and communication reduces medical errors, costs, and
waste, and improves safety, efficiency, anxiety, problem-solving,
and quality of care.36 Communication and teamwork may be
enhanced through an audit-feedback loop. When both monthly
team and individual audits and feedback were completed, compliance improved.37 One site used this method to help staff learn
about massive blood transfusions through training simulation
(Table 2, wrong blood). They incorporated a debrief portion
during the simulation and after real-life events. This same team
also implemented a time-out upon delivery of the blood product
to improve communication and verification of patient, blood type,
and compatibility. Other RCAs resulted in creation of timeouts
and simulation events as well.
These RCAs show how facilities have different policies, procedures, training availability, resources, and technological access.
One of the most common actions was to revise or create local
policies along with standardizing processes within the facility.
However, there still remain differing processes throughout the

entire VHA. True standardization would allow an individual to
switch from hospital to hospital and be able to tackle the job as
they did at a previous location. Safe transfusion relies on 100%
compliance to standard operating procedures (SOP) and checklists.38 Standardization of the blood transfusion processes and
use of a transfusion bundle may reduce errors. The World Health
Organization’s High 5s project defines process standardization as
“the specification and communication of a process at a level of
detail sufficient to permit consistent and verifiable implementation by different users in different settings.”39 This project aims to
standardize processes not only within countries, but across countries. The project will aid in production of systematic designs for
continuous improvement, local adaptations, and varying implementations without modifying the SOPs.39 Standardization may be
reinforced by using a transfusion bundle. Borgert et. al. observed
a reduction of inappropriate transfusions and improved compliance with transfusion protocols when the bundle was used.29
Safety is not a competition, but a coordinated maneuver.40

Recommendations
The following recommendations are correlated with the weaknesses found within the blood transfusion processes, as seen in
Figure 3. These are based on the RCA outcomes and available
research to reduce errors within health systems.
1.

Enhanced, standardized, timely training and educational
seminars with appropriate supplemental materials (e.g.,
simulation training with checklists for practice massive
blood transfusions)

and tracked at the discretion of the PSM from each facility. These
outcomes are not inputted into the RCA database; therefore, the
efficacy of the actions cannot be commented upon or shared.

Conclusion
The data presented in this study regarding blood transfusion
within the VHA lists the building blocks needed to bridge patient
safety, process development, training, communication, and standardization. Enhanced standardization within the blood transfusion process may decrease patient safety events. Collaboration
and communication between facilities will allow each to apply
techniques from other locations to their own. The National Patient
Safety Foundation Free From Harm report states initiatives to
improve healthcare stall due to inadequate collaboration.40 In
order to charge into the realm of greater patient safety and quality
improvement, everyone within healthcare systems must collaborate, communicate, and standardize the systems and processes
currently in place.
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